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I AM WOMAN, HEAR ME ROAR: DENIAL OF SEXUAL 
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR TRANSGENDER INMATES AND 





I. INTRODUCTION  
Adree Edmo.  Vanessa Lynn Gibson.  Michelle Kosilek.  These 
are the names of three transgender women currently incarcerated 
within the United States prison system.1  They have been fighting for 
their right to receive life changing gender confirmation surgery that 
will successfully alleviate the severe symptoms associated with their 
gender dysphoria diagnoses.2  The United States prison system does 
not view gender confirmation surgery as medically necessary for 
transgender individuals with diagnoses of gender dysphoria, but the 
medical community largely disagrees.3  The basis of these women’s 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2022; State 
University of New York at New Paltz, B.A in Political Science, 2017.  I would like 
to give many thanks to my faculty advisor, Professor Meredith Miller for her help in 
formulating the idea for this Note, as well as her continued guidance throughout the 
writing and editing process.  I would also like to thank my notes editors, Alessandra 
Albano and Katherine Carroll, and the editorial board and entire staff of the Touro 
Law Review for their support and help in preparing this Note for publication.  I would 
also like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for the opportunity to participate on the 
Touro Law Review and for the ability to write this Note.  Lastly, I want to thank my 
friends and family for their continued support in this process. 
1 Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 
(5th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
2 Although the courts use the term “sex reassignment surgery,” this Note will use the 
term “gender confirmation surgery” throughout its entirety as it is the preferred term 
given by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health Standards of 
Care and the transgender community. 
3 WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF 
CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER 
1
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fight lies in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment and their argument that denying them access to obtain 
gender confirmation surgery constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.4 
Since its holding Estelle v. Gamble5 the Supreme Court has 
long held that punishment is cruel and unusual when an inmate has a 
serious medical need and prison officials are deliberately indifferent to 
that medical need.6  Gender confirmation surgery is a controversial 
subject within both the legal and medical communities as society has 
become increasingly more aware and accepting of transgender 
individuals and their needs.7  In Edmo v. Corizon,8 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was the first court to hold that denial of gender 
confirmation surgery for a transgender inmate violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9  In Edmo, the 
Ninth Circuit gave considerable deference to the medical community’s 
acceptance of the World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health Standards of Care for transgender individuals in addition to the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistics 
Manual’s definition of gender dysphoria.10  The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding created a split among the circuit courts that have decided the 
same issue.11  The First and Fifth Circuits have both held that there is 
no Eighth Amendment violation when transgender inmates are denied 
sex reassignment surgery.12  While both circuits recognized that gender 
 
NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 67 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS OF 
CARE]. 
4 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 
(2015); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2019), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 
653 (2019); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 775 (9th Cir. 2019), cert denied, 
141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). 
5 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
6 Id. at 98. 
7 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 78 (discussing medical expert’s  strong alternate views to sex 
reassignment surgery); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216 (stating that medical professionals 
and the prison system disagree with sex reassignment surgery); cf. Edmo, 935 F.3d 
at 769-70 (stating that World Professional Association Standards of Care are the 
internationally recognized and accepted standards of care, and that the majority 
opinion of the medical community is that gender confirmation surgery is safe, 
effective, and medically necessary for some transgender individuals). 
8 Edmo, 935 F.3d 757. 
9 Id. at 767; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
10 935 F.3d at 769. 
11 See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96; see also Gibson, 920 F.3d at 228. 
12 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219. 
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dysphoria is a medical condition that creates a serious medical need, 
both also deemed gender confirmation surgery as not medically 
necessary due to the existence of less extreme remedies that they 
viewed as equally effective in relieving the severe symptoms 
associated with gender dysphoria.13  Additionally, both circuits held 
that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent regarding the 
medical need for gender confirmation surgery for transgender 
inmates.14 
This Note will focus on the rights of transgender inmates with 
severe gender dysphoria to receive gender confirmation surgery by 
examining the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment and the medical community’s acceptance of the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health Standards of Care 
(“WPATH Standards of Care”).  It will address the severe symptoms 
that are common with diagnoses of gender dysphoria and how gender 
confirmation surgery can greatly alleviate those symptoms.  This Note 
will argue that denial of gender confirmation surgery of transgender 
inmates with severe gender dysphoria is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  This Note will 
further argue that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in 
at least one of the three cases to decide the issue.  This Note will also 
propose a rule that gender confirmation surgery should be provided to 
a transgender inmate when there is a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and 
the requirements under the WPATH Standards of Care for eligibility 
of gender confirmation surgery are met. 
This Note will be divided into seven parts.  Part II will provide 
the history and values of the Eighth Amendment.  It will also examine 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Estelle v. Gamble and its two-prong 
test for determining when a punishment is cruel and unusual.  Part III 
will discuss how gender dysphoria is defined under the American 
Psychiatric Association’s DSM-5.  Part IV will discuss the WPATH 
Standards of Care and its increased acceptance within the medical 
community as the leading guidance for transgender health and well-
being.  Part V will discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding and opinion in 
Edmo v. Corizon. It will also discuss the creation of the circuit split 
 
13 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 89; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221 (discussing the First Circuit’s 
opinion in Kosilek that there are other less extreme measures available for Gibson 
that were provided to Kosilek, such as hormones, electrolysis, feminine clothing and 
accessories, and mental health services). 
14 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223. 
3
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and examine the First and Fifth Circuits holdings in Kosilek v. 
Spencer15 and Gibson v. Collier,16 respectively.  Part VI will discuss 
why the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to decide the 
issue and will propose a rule that gender confirmation surgery should 
be provided for transgender inmates with gender dysphoria diagnoses 
and who meet the requirements for gender confirmation surgery under 
the WPATH Standards of Care.  Finally, Part VII will conclude the 
Note. 
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Defined 
The Eighth Amendment states that “excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”17  The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to 
protect people from both cruel and unusual punishments and 
treatments while incarcerated.18  Although the Eighth Amendment 
originally protected from harsh punishments, it has been expanded to 
include treatment of inmates in prison.19  The Supreme Court 
established a definition of cruel and unusual punishment in the 1976 
case of Estelle v. Gamble.20  In Estelle, the respondent Gamble claimed 
a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials 
denied him treatment for injuries sustained while performing a prison 
work assignment.21  The Court held that “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”22  
The Court stated that the legislative history and changing views of 
modern society shapes its interpretation of what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.23  The Eighth Amendment extends beyond 
physically cruel and unusual punishment, and “proscribes more than 
 
15 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
16 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
18 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 98. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976)). 
23 Id. 
4
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physically barbarous punishments.”24  The punishment should be 
proportionate to the sentence, as “[t]he Amendment embodies ‘broad 
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 
decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal measures.”25  
Additionally, the Court noted that “[w]e have held repugnant to the 
Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society, or which ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.’”26 
The Court in Estelle also unambiguously stated what would not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment: medical malpractice or 
simple negligence on the part of a medical professional.27  Likewise, 
an “unforeseeable accident” will not be sufficient to constitute a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.28  Although an accident may 
create additional suffering, that suffering alone does not characterize 
“wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.”29  An unintentional failure to 
provide adequate medical care will similarly not be sufficient to 
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.30  Ultimately, to state a 
cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment, “a prisoner must 
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.  It is only such indifference that 
can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”31 
B. Deliberate Indifference and Medical Care of 
 
24 Id. at 102. 
25 Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
26 Id. at 102-03 (first quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); then quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
27 Id. at 104. 
28 Id. at 105.  The Court cited , La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) 
as an example of an accident that does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.  
The Court concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment violation when a second 
electrocution attempt moved forward after a medical malfunction thwarted the first 
attempt. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 105-06. 
31 Id. at 106. 
5
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Prisoners 
Estelle’s “deliberate indifference” test is used to decide 
whether an inmate had access to adequate medical care.32  In order to 
prove an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must satisfy a two 
prong test: “(1) an objective prong that requires proof of a serious 
medical need, and (2) a subjective prong that mandates a showing of 
prison administrators’ deliberate indifference to that need.”33  The 
inmate must show that the medical need is one that has been diagnosed 
by a medical doctor as needing treatment, or one that is so obvious that 
even a lay person would recognize the need for a medical 
professional’s attention.34  The subjective prong can be shown by 
proving that there was a deliberate indifference through a “wanton 
disregard” to the inmate’s needs, although the disregard must be so 
substantial that it requires a conscious risk of easily preventable 
impending harm.35  The inmate must prove deliberate indifference by 
showing an act or omission that fails to respond to an inmate’s medical 
need and that the harm suffered by the inmate was caused by that act 
or omission.36 
General agreement and acceptance among the medical 
community for care and practice are “highly relevant in determining 
what care is medically acceptable and unacceptable.”37  A difference 
of opinion between a physician and an inmate, or between physicians 
will not constitute what is medically acceptable and therefore will not 
be sufficient to prove deliberate indifference for an Eighth Amendment 
claim.38  However, the insufficiency will only hold weight if the 
opinions of those physicians are both medically acceptable under the 
circumstances.39 
Over the past two decades, the medical community relied 
largely on the WPATH Standards of Care regarding treatment for 
transgender individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria,40 including 
 
32 Id. at 97. 
33 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 83. 
36 Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp.3d 1164, 1186 (N.D. Ca. 2015). 
37 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 769. 
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when gender confirmation surgery (“GCS”) is medically necessary.41  
While the medical community has increasingly relied on the WPATH 
Standards of Care, the judicial system has not been as quick to defer.42  
This means that, for transgender inmates, availability of GCS as 
medically necessary while incarcerated is a topic hotly debated and 
wildly controversial within the legal community.43 
III. GENDER DYSPHORIA DEFINED 
Generally, whether a person is eligible for GCS is determined 
based on a diagnosis of gender dysphoria under the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (“DSM-
5”).44  For incarcerated transgender inmates, a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria and the severity of that diagnosis without the possibility for 
GCS can mean living a life filled with constant mental and emotional 
anguish, self-hatred, and attempts at self-harm, including suicide and 
self-castration.45  
Gender dysphoria is defined as a marked incongruence 
between one’s experienced or expressed gender and assigned gender 
at birth.46  Diagnosis for gender dysphoria requires that this 
incongruence must have a duration of at least six months, and must be 
manifested by at least two of the marked criteria stated in the DSM-
5.47  Additionally, the incongruence must also be causing pain and 
 
41  WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3. 
42 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier 920 F.3d 212 
(5th Cir. 2019). But see Edmo, 935 F.3d 757.  
43 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-74; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216; Edmo, 936 F.3d at 769. 
44 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 452 
(5th ed. 2013). 
45 Id. at 455. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  The criteria in the DSM-5 for gender dysphoria are: 
(1) a marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender, 
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics; (2) a strong desire to be 
rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a 
marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender; (3) a 
strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the 
other gender; (4) a strong desire to be of the other gender (or some 
alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender; (5) a strong desire 
to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from 
one’s assigned gender); (6) a strong conviction that one has the typical 
feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender 
different from one’s assigned gender). 
7
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suffering.48  Gender dysphoria is generally associated with significant 
mental and emotional agony or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.49  In adults, “this distress 
manifests because of the strong incongruence between the experienced 
gender and somatic sex.”50  However, the physical and emotional 
torment based on the incongruence can be mitigated or alleviated by 
supportive environments and “knowledge that biomedical treatments 
exists to reduce the incongruence.”51  The standards of care within the 
realm of transgender individuals has consistently been moving toward 
the standards of care suggested by the WPATH Standards of Care 
within the last two decades.52 
IV. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER 
HEALTH STANDARDS OF CARE 
A. Purpose and Goal of the SOC 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health is 
a worldwide association whose purpose is to promote several different 
areas of transgender health.53  The WPATH Standards of Care state 
that one of its main functions is “to promote the highest standards of 
health care for individuals through the articulation of WPATH 
Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and 
Gender Nonconforming People.”54  The Standards of Care are based 
on “the best available science and expert professional consensus.”55  
The overall goal of the WPATH Standards of Care is to provide 
clinical guidance for medical professionals to assist transgender people 
with “safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting personal 
comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their overall 
health, psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.”56  Clinical 
 
Id. 
48 Id. at 453. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 455. 
51 Id. (emphasis added). 
52 WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 1. 
53 Id. “[A]n international, multidisciplinary, professional association whose mission 
is to promote evidence-based care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and 
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guidance includes various types of care, including hormonal and 
surgical treatments.57  Further, the WPATH Standards of Care state 
that while the standards are primarily for medical professionals, they 
can, and should, also be used by social institutions to better understand 
how to aid and promote the wellbeing of transgender individuals.58 
The WPATH Standards of Care explain that while the 
standards are flexible, they offer “optimal health care and guiding 
treatment of people experiencing gender dysphoria.”59  Treatment is 
individualized on the severity of the person’s diagnosis.60  Hormone 
therapy or surgery can effectively alleviate an individual’s gender 
dysphoria and is medically necessary for many people because it 
significantly reduces comorbid conditions that are generally associated 
with gender dysphoria and allows individuals to live a life as their 
expressed gender.61 
B. When is Gender Confirmation Surgery Medically 
Necessary 
Effective treatments for relieving symptoms of gender 
dysphoria range from regular psychotherapy to more permanent and 
extreme remedies such as hormone injections and gender confirmation 
surgery62  GCS brings physical changes to the body and an individual’s 
primary and secondary sex characteristics.63  While many transgender 
individuals can find comfort with their gender identity and expression 
without surgery, for others surgery is essential and medically necessary 
in order to alleviate their gender dysphoria.64  For those who cannot 
mitigate their gender dysphoria through psychotherapy alone, a change 
in primary or secondary sex characteristics is necessary to achieve 
greater congruence with their gender identity.65  Several post-surgery 
follow-up studies have shown an “undeniable beneficial effect of 
 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (emphasis added). 






64 Id. at 54. 
65 Id. 
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gender confirmation surgery on postoperative outcomes.”66  The 
WPATH Standards of Care emphasize that GCS is not an elective 
surgery, and that an assessment of the individual by mental health 
professionals should determine whether GCS is medically necessary.67  
The WPATH Standards of Care set out specific guidelines to 
determine when GCS is medically necessary. 
When transgender individuals express a desire for GCS, they 
must go through a series of mental and physical evaluations that will 
determine if reconstructive surgery is medically necessary.68  While 
the standards for GCS recommendation are largely individualized, 
each potential candidate for surgery must have medical documentation 
of persistent gender dysphoria.69  Persistent gender dysphoria means 
that a patient must exhibit significant distress because they are unable 
to live a complete life as their experienced or expressed gender.70  The 
general threshold criteria for both male-to-female and female-to-male 
transitions are “(1) persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria; (2) 
capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent for 
treatment; (3) age of majority; and (4) if significant medical or mental 
health concerns are present, they must be reasonably well 
controlled.”71  A person requesting genital reconstructive surgery has 
additional criteria that are: “(1) twelve continuous months of hormone 
therapy as appropriate to the patient’s gender goals, and (2) twelve 
continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent with 
their gender identity.”72  The rationale for these last two criteria are 
 
66 Id. at 55; see De Cuypere et al., Sexual And Physical Health After Sex 
Reassignment Surgery, ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV., 34(6), 679-90 (2005); Gijs & 
Brewaeys, Surgical Treatment Of Gender Dysphoria In Adults And Adolescents: 
Recent Developments, Effectiveness, And Challenges, ANN. REV. OF SEX RSCH., 18, 
178-224 (2007);  Klein & Gorzalka, Sexual Functioning In Transsexuals Following 
Hormone Therapy And Genital Surgery: A Review (CME), THE J. OF SEXUAL MED. 
6(11) 2922-39, (2009); Pfafflin & Junge, Thirty Years Of International Follow-Up 
Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Comprehensive Review, 1961-1991, 
INT’L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM (1998) (discussing the beneficial outcomes of GCS, 
including subjective well-being, cosmesis and sexual function). 
67 WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 33 (A qualified mental health 
professional is one that is comfortable and experienced working with transsexual, 
transgender, and gender non-conforming people.). 
68 Id. at 58. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 59. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 60. 
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that the experience of living for twelve months as their preferred 
gender identity “provides ample opportunity for patients to experience 
and socially adjust in their desired gender role, before undergoing 
irreversible surgery.”73  A change in gender role can bring significant 
personal and social consequences, so the decision to receive GCS 
should include “an awareness of what the familial, interpersonal, 
educational, vocational, economic, and legal challenges are likely to 
be, so that people can function successfully in their gender role.”74  The 
criteria of living for twelve months as an individual’s congruent gender 
identity is the crux of why transgender individuals within the prison 
system consistently hit a wall when it comes to requesting GCS and its 
medical necessity.75  Medical experts inside the prison system disagree 
on whether transgender individuals can actually experience living as 
their expressed gender roles for the required period, because within 
many prison systems in the United States, inmates are housed based on 
their genitalia.76 
C. WPATH Standards of Care Applicability to 
Transgender Individuals Within the Prison System 
For many people diagnosed with gender dysphoria, the 
intensity of the associated distress meets the criteria for a formal 
diagnosis as a mental disorder.77  The WPATH Standards of Care state 
that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria “is not a license for stigmatization 
or for the deprivation of civil and human rights.”78  This means that a 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria should not go to the identity of the 
person but describe the person’s struggle within their diagnosis.79 
For transgender individuals with diagnoses of gender 
dysphoria within the prison system, access to medical care, including 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 61. 
75 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the district court’s 
disagreement with Kosilek’s medical expert that a real-life experience could not 
occur in prison); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 771 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(discussing that the WPATH Standards of Care explicitly state that for transgender 
individuals living in an institutional environment, the standards should “mirror that 
which would be available to them if they were living in a non-institutional setting 
within the same community.”). 
76 See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769. But see Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73. 
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hormone therapy and GCS is largely based on policies within the 
various Departments of Corrections (“DOC”), as well as how inmates 
are housed.80  However, the WPATH Standards of Care emphasize that 
any and all guidelines and treatment options put forth in its standards 
apply to people in institutional environments, including prisons.81  The 
WPATH Standards of Care assert that “[p]eople should not be 
discriminated against in their access to appropriate health care based 
on where they live, including institutional environments such as 
prisons or long/intermediate health care facilities.”82  Further, health 
care for transgender people living in an institutional environment 
should be the same that would be available to them if they were living 
in a non-institutional setting within the same community.83  If there is 
not a medical or healthcare professional within the DOC that has 
significant experience in dealing with gender dysphoria or transgender 
individuals, the WPATH Standards of Care express that “it is 
appropriate to obtain outside consultation from the professionals who 
are knowledgeable about this specialized area of health care.”84  The 
WPATH Standards of Care also aver that “reasonable 
accommodations in the institutional environment” can be made in the 
delivery of care for transgender individuals, and “denial of needed 
changes in gender role or access to treatments, including GCS, on the 
basis of residence in an institution are not reasonable accommodations 
under the WPATH Standards of Care.”85 
Policies within the DOC system provide different reasons for 
the availability or unavailability of GCS to transgender inmates.86  
Some DOCs point to safety and security concerns regarding 
availability of GCS for transgender individuals, rather than relying on 
the standards of care relevant to the medical community in relation to 
transgender individuals.87  In other instances, some judges have found 
that WPATH Standards of Care outweigh DOC safety and security 
 
80 See Edmo 935 F.3d at 769; see also Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73. 




85 Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
86 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92-94 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the 
Massachusetts DOC’s security concerns for postoperative male-to-female inmates 
being housed in an all-female prison population should be given great deference 
because of the DOC’s expertise in the area). 
87 Id. at 73-74. 
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concerns, or have found that the stated safety and security concerns 
lack merit.88  These safety and security concerns play a significant part 
in resolving whether denying GCS to a transgender inmate is a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.89 
V. EXAMINING CASES OF TRANSGENDER INMATES AND THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The Ninth Circuit and the Creation of the Circuit 
Split 
The question of whether denial of GCS for a transgender 
inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria constitutes a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment is a fairly current debate among the legal 
community.  The Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Edmo v. Corizon, 
Inc.90 has created a split among the few circuits who have answered 
the question.91 
In Edmo, the petitioner, Adree Edmo (“Edmo”), identified and 
was living as a woman for several years.92  Although Edmo had been 
prescribed hormone injections and regularly had access to and attended 
psychotherapy, she felt continued “distress and frustration” because 
she was still identified by her assigned sex at birth as well as “disgust” 
toward her male genitalia.93  Additionally, Edmo attempted suicide and 
self-castration multiple times because of her inability to suppress her 
feelings stemming from her gender dysphoria through hormones and 
psychotherapy.94  Edmo was eventually evaluated for GCS after her 
attempts at self-castration by the DOC’s mental health professional.95  
She was ultimately denied GCS based on the medical provider’s 
conclusion that she “did not meet the criteria” and therefore GCS “was 
not medically necessary.”96  Edmo sued the DOC alleging violation of 
 
88 Id. at 110-11 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
89 See 774 F.3d at 70; Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019); But see Edmo 
v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019). 
90 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767. 
91 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 53, 92-94 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Gibson v. Collier, 
920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019); Edmo, 935 F.3d 757. 
92 935 F.3d at 771-72. 
93 Id. at 772. 
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her Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment, 
as well as an injunction requiring the DOC to provide her with GCS.97  
The district court found for Edmo, and the DOC appealed.98  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision and held 
that the Indiana DOC was deliberately indifferent to Edmo’s serious 
medical need.99  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of the injunction that Edmo be provided with GCS.100 
The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by defining gender 
dysphoria using the DSM-5 and emphasizing that the WPATH 
Standards Of Care are the internationally recognized and accepted 
standards of care regarding transgender individuals.101  The court 
compared the WPATH Standards of Care to the “standards” of the 
DOC medical provider who had denied Edmo GCS and concluded that 
“Dr. Eliason did not follow accepted standards of care in the area of 
transgender health care.”102  The court further criticized Dr. Eliason’s 
criteria as “apparently invented out of whole cloth” and “so far afield 
from the WPATH standards that we cannot characterize his decision 
as a flexible application of or deviation from those standards.”103  This 
flows directly from the holding in Estelle v. Gamble,104 where the 
Supreme Court stated that while difference of opinion among medical 
professionals will not create a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, 
that difference of opinion will only be insufficient for an Eighth 
 
97 Id. at 776-77. 
98 Id. at 780. 
99 Id. at 785. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 769 (“And many of the major medical and mental health groups in the 
United States – including the American Medical Association, the American Medical 
Student Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Psychological Association, the American Family Practice Association, the 
Endocrine Society, the National Association of Social Workers, the American 
Academy of Plastic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, Health 
Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, the HIV Medicine Association, the 
Lesbian, Bisexual, Gat and Transgender Physician Assistant Caucus, and Mental 
Health America – recognize the WPATH Standards of Care as representing the 
consensus of the medical and mental health communities regarding the appropriate 
treatment for transgender and gender dysphoric individuals.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 791 (Dr. Eliason’s standards were stated to be “(1) ‘congenital 
malformations or ambiguous genitalia,’ (2) ‘severe and devastating dysphoria that is 
primarily due to genitals,’ or (3) ‘some type of medical problem in which endogenous 
sexual hormones were causing severe psychological damage.’”). 
104 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). 
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Amendment claim if both medical opinions are accepted within the 
medical community.105 
The court then went on to discuss the deliberate indifference 
standard as set forth in Estelle and held that “Dr. Eliason knew of and 
disregarded the substantial risk of severe harm to Edmo.”106  The Ninth 
Circuit is the first court to hold that denying GCS to a transgender 
inmate with gender dysphoria who meets the WPATH Standards of 
Care criteria is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment.107  The Ninth Circuit based its holding on the 
medical opinions of Edmo’s experts, who established that the WPATH 
Standards of Care are the medically accepted standards of care within 
the transgender medical community.108  Additionally, the court also 
considered the severity of Edmo’s gender dysphoria diagnosis.109 
B. The Sister Circuits Holdings that Denying GCS For 
a Transgender Inmate Is Not a Violation of The 
Eighth Amendment 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the First and Fifth 
Circuits have both held that denying a transgender inmate GCS did not 
constitute deliberate indifference on the part of medical providers and 
the DOC, and therefore the denial was not a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.110  Both circuits conceded that a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need thus satisfying the first 
prong of the Estelle test.111  Both circuits found a lack of deliberate 
indifference for different reasons.112  The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Kosilek emphasized safety and security concerns, as well 
as disagreement over whether the WPATH Standards of Care are 
widely accepted within the medical community in holding that denial 
of GCS does not violate the Eighth Amendment.113  The Fifth Circuit’s 
 
105 Edmo, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (This was also supported by the experts that Edmo put 
forth at her evidentiary hearing, who described Dr. Eliason’s “criteria” as “bizarre . 
. . I just don’t understand what Dr. Eliason is talking about here.”). 
106 Id. at 793. 
107 Id. at 786. 
108 Id. at 785. 
109 Id. at 787-91. 
110 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 
(5th Cir. 2019). 
111 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219. 
112 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91-92; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225-26. 
113 Kosilek, 774 F.3d  at 92. 
15
Haueter: I Am Woman, Hear Me Roar
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1042 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
holding in Gibson similarly emphasized the debate on WPATH 
Standards of Care and additionally interpreted the Eighth Amendment 
from a textualist perspective.114 
i. The First Circuit  
In Kosilek, petitioner Michelle Kosilek was born biologically 
male, but identifies as female.115  She was diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria at the start of her incarceration.116  While awaiting her 
criminal trial, she twice attempted suicide and made one attempt at 
self-castration as a result of her frustration at being anatomically 
male.117  Although she has not attempted self-mutilation for the 
duration of the last twenty years, she has been fighting for GCS since 
her sentence began.118  In her first attempt at fighting for GCS, the 
district court denied a finding of deliberate indifference due to the 
DOC’s unawareness of Kosilek’s serious medical need for more than 
“supportive therapy” for her gender dysphoria.119  Although the district 
court found for the DOC, it made clear that a failure to provide more 
than psychotherapy to Kosilek in the future could amount to an Eighth 
Amendment violation since the DOC was now on notice that gender 
dysphoria was found to constitute a serious medical need.120  In 
response, the DOC revamped its “freeze frame” policy on medical 
treatment, and amended the policy to allow inmates to receive 
additional medical treatment beyond the level they were receiving 
prior to incarceration.121  As a result of this change in policy, Kosilek 
received hormones, gender-appropriate clothing, and a procedure that 
permanently removed her facial hair, in addition to continued 
psychotherapy.122 
 
114 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 227. 
115 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68. 
116 Id. at 69-70. 




121 Id.  A “freeze frame” policy is one that does not allow for medical treatment 
beyond what an inmate received prior to becoming incarcerated.  An example would 
be where an inmate was receiving hormone treatment for gender dysphoria prior to 
incarceration, and due to the “freeze frame” policy, hormone levels would not be 
allowed to be increased as needed once the prisoner started his or her incarceration.  
Id. 
122 Id. at 69-70. 
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Since receiving this additional treatment, Kosilek still felt a 
deep sense of distress regarding her male genitalia, and was ultimately 
assessed for GCS by an outside medical provider, the Fenway Center, 
that was experienced in transgender health.123  The Fenway Center’s 
report stated that Kosilek should receive GCS because she fell within 
the WPATH Standards of Care guidelines, and GCS would “allow 
Michelle full relief of her gender dysphoria” as well as “increase her 
chance for survival.”124  Despite this report, the DOC turned to another 
expert who determined that “surgery . . . was not medically 
necessary”125 for Kosilek and ultimately denied Kosilek’s request for 
GCS.126 
In its holding, the First Circuit relied on a single expert’s 
disagreement with the WPATH Standards of Care, in addition to the 
DOC’s safety and security concerns about allowing Kosilek’s GCS to 
move forward.127  The outside expert, Dr. Osborne, opined that she 
believed that a penal institution was not able to satisfy the WPATH 
Standards of Care requirement of control of comorbid conditions, and 
therefore that standard could not be applied to incarcerated persons.128  
Although the Fenway Center medical experts disagreed and pointed to 
the WPATH Standards of Care’s direction that “persons receiving 
treatment should continue to receive appropriate treatment . . . after 
incarceration,”129 the court reasoned that there were two alternate and 
adequate choices that the DOC could take in its decision.130  The court 
said that “the law is clear” where two alternative courses of medical 
treatment exist, it is not the place of the court to “second guess medical 
judgments” or “require that the DOC adopt the more compassionate of 
two adequate options.”131 
With respect to safety and security concerns, the court 
determined that the reasonable concerns raised by the DOC regarding 
post-operative, male-to-female transgender individuals takes “no great 
stretch of the imagination.”132  The DOC’s primary concerns were not 
 
123 Id. at 71. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 104. 
126 Id. at 71. 
127 Id. at 72. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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related to Kosilek’s safety at all. The DOC’s first safety concern was 
that housing a formerly male inmate with a history of domestic 
violence within a female prison population would create safety 
concerns for the other female prisoners because some of them had been 
subjected to domestic violence prior to incarceration.133  Similarly, 
DOC’s second concern  did not examine Kosilek’s personal safety.  
The DOC averred that providing GCS to Kosilek would essentially be 
giving into her “desired benefit” and that the flood gates would burst 
open with threats of suicide by all prisoners who are denied their 
“desired benefits” in order to get their way.134  The court held that great 
deference should be given to DOC concerns about safety and security 
because they have the experience and greater knowledge needed to 
make those kinds of determinations.135 
The court’s final holding rested on the fact that because the 
DOC had chosen to provide care that falls just short of providing GCS, 
there was no showing of deliberate indifference to Kosilek’s serious 
medical need.136  Thus, the court held that there was no Eighth 
Amendment violation.137  However, the First Circuit’s holding in 
Kosilek essentially placed a blanket ban on GCS availability for 
transgender inmates, as the Fifth Circuit pointed out in its opinion in 
Gibson v. Collier.138 
ii. The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gibson relied heavily on the 
First Circuit’s holding in Kosilek. The court ultimately held that the 
denial of GCS to a transgender inmate is not a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.139  In addition to relying on the Kosilek opinion, the Fifth 
Circuit also interpreted the Eighth Amendment from a textualist 
perspective.140 
In Gibson, the petitioner, Vanessa Lynn Gibson (“Gibson”), 
was born male but identified as female and was diagnosed with gender 
 
133 Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 




138 Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 224-25 (5th Cir. 2019). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 226-27. 
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dysphoria at the age of fifteen.141  After being incarcerated for 
aggravated murder, Gibson sought GCS to alleviate her gender 
dysphoria.142  However, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
(“TDCJ”) denied the surgery because of a policy that did not allow 
GCS as a treatment option for gender dysphoria.143  Gibson sued 
claiming a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging that the 
TDCJ’s policy created a de facto blanket ban on GCS as a treatment 
option for transgender inmates.144  Here, Gibson did not seek an 
injunction to be provided surgery, but merely to be evaluated for GCS 
within the TDCJ policy.145 
The Fifth Circuit, like both the First and Ninth Circuits, 
conceded that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need and therefore 
satisfies the first prong of Estelle’s two-prong test.146  However, unlike 
the Ninth Circuit in Edmo, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need if a “genuine debate” 
exists within the medical community.147  To support this 
determination, the court proffered what is essentially a brand new 
standard of “universal acceptance” by the medical community148 to 
determine the acceptable standard of care, instead of following the 
precedent that was established over forty years ago in Estelle.149  The 
Estelle precedent states that the standard of care is measured by what 
is widely accepted within the medical community.150  To further 
bolster its conclusion, the court cited to three experts that testified for 
the State, who alleged that there are “less invasive procedures that are 
considered adequate.”151 
The Fifth Circuit in Gibson attempted to create a new way to 
interpret the Eighth Amendment in determining whether a violation 
has occurred.152  The court said that the text and original understanding 
 
141 Id. at 216-17. 
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 218. 
145 Id. 
146 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). 
147 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220. 
148 Id. 
149 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. 
150 Id. 
151 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 222. The less invasive procedures include hormones and 
access to psychotherapy.  Id. 
152 Id. 
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of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language means that 
the punishment must be both cruel and unusual.153  The court reasoned 
that denying GCS was not unusual because GCS is not widely 
practiced in prisons.154  When Gibson was decided, only California in 
2017, had performed GCS on a transgender prison inmate.155  
California only performed the GCS after a lawsuit was filed, but there 
was ultimately a settlement agreement that included the surgery.156  
The court concluded that “there is no basis in Eighth Amendment 
precedent as well as the text or original understanding of the 
Constitution that would allow a holding of deliberate indifference for 
not taking sides in a medical debate that is widely disputed within the 
medical community.”157 
VI. THE PROPOSED RULE AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CERTIORARI 
While the Ninth Circuit held that denial of GCS to a 
transgender inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, this was 
only a small win for the transgender and prison community.158  The 
Idaho DOC ultimately petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, 
which was denied.159  The Supreme Court should have granted 
certiorari in this instance because it would have given the Court the 
opportunity to make a final and binding decision on the issue, and thus 
establish binding precedent that would solidify the WPATH Standards 
of Care as the medically accepted standard of care in the field of 
transgender health. 
For too long, transgender inmates have been subjected to 
significant disrespect, trauma, and abuse, not only at the hands of 
prison officials and fellow inmates, and in some instances even the 







158 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019). 
159 ID DOC v. Edmo, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
160 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772 (discussing the several disciplinary actions Edmo faced at 
the hands of prison officials for presenting as female, including wearing makeup and 
wearing her hair in feminine hairstyles). 
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Gibson, Judge Ho repeatedly deadnamed the plaintiff, referring to 
Vanessa Lynn Gibson as “he” or by her given name at birth, “Scott.”161  
Not only does Judge Ho’s refusal to recognize Gibson’s gender 
constitute a great disrespect towards Gibson as an individual, it also 
sets the outcome of the decision without actually having to read the 
words of the opinion itself.  One can infer from his usage of the wrong 
pronoun when referring to Gibson that the decision has already been 
made in favor of the DOC.  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in Edmo references several instances where Edmo was given citations 
by prison officers for simply presenting as feminine and identifying as 
her preferred gender.162 
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Granted 
Certiorari 
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to the 
Indiana DOC.  Although it was the DOC in this case that petitioned the 
Court to reverse the lower court’s decision and ultimately reverse the 
ruling that it needed to provide Edmo GCS, it would have given the 
Court the opportunity to clarify what medical standards are required 
for transgender inmates under the Eighth Amendment.  The rule that 
should be adopted by the Court is one that provides GCS for a 
transgender inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and who 
satisfies the requirements under the WPATH Standards of Care.  This 
rule will arguably prevent several transgender inmates from 
succumbing to their associated comorbid conditions such as depression 
and self-harm and will ultimately save lives by preventing suicide 
among those transgender inmates. 
B. The Proposed Rule 
The WPATH Standards of Care list several comorbid 
conditions that are associated with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria.163  
Comorbid conditions can include anxiety, depression, self-harm, 
 
161 Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).  “Deadnaming” is using the name 
that a transgender person was given at birth and no longer uses upon transitioning.  
Deadname, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/deadname (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
162 Edmo, 935 F.3d 757. 
163 WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 24. 
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compulsivity, sexual concerns, and psychiatric disorders.164  The 
WPATH Standards of Care states that if these conditions are left 
untreated, it can “complicate the process of gender identity exploration 
and resolution of gender dysphoria.”165  Thus, hormone therapy or 
psychotherapy alone are not sufficient for transgender inmates who 
have severe diagnoses of gender dysphoria.  The denial of GCS or even 
evaluation for GCS may likely lead to higher rates of suicide.  By 
creating a rule that a DOC provides and pays for GCS for a transgender 
inmate who presents severe gender dysphoria and falls within the 
WPATH Standards of Care requirements for GCS eligibility can 
decrease the likelihood of comorbid conditions and death among 
transgender inmates. 
Additionally, housing transgender inmates based on their 
biological sex and expressed gender without GCS opens up the door 
for abuse by prison officials and other inmates.  According to the 
National Center for Transgender Equality (“NCTE”), transgender 
inmates are exposed to “horrific rates of abuse by both staff and their 
fellow inmates.”166  A survey by the U.S. Transgender Survey 
(“USTS”) found that “transgender people are ten times as likely to be 
sexually assaulted by their fellow inmates and five times as likely to 
be sexually assaulted by staff.”167  The NCTE also states that 
transgender prisoners are more likely to face “lengthy stays in solitary 
confinement.”168  This is not conducive to the mental health of a 
transgender inmate who has a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and 
additionally, it is more likely to result in attempts at self-harm.  
Accordingly, transgender inmates should be placed in a facility based 
on their gender identity and not their assigned sex at birth. 
The First and Fifth Circuits in Kosilek and Gibson both 
expressed security concerns about housing and moving transgender 
inmates to a prison population based on transgender inmates’ gender 
identity rather than their assigned sex at birth.169  The security concerns 
asserted by the DOC in Kosilek stated that transferring Kosilek to a 
female detention center increased the risk of escape and fear among 
 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 25. 
166 Police, Jails & Prisons, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., 
https://www.transequality.org/issues/police-jails-prisons. (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 
212, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (Barksdale, J., dissenting). 
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the other female prisoners who had formerly been subjected to physical 
and mental abuse by their partners.170  However, the NCTE states that 
“[w]hile any prisoner is capable of engaging in abusive conduct, there 
is simply no evidence to believe that transgender women present any 
more risk to their fellow women prisoners than other women.”171  
Additionally, the NCTE states that “a growing number of corrections 
facilities for youth and adults have successfully housed transgender 
women alongside other women without experiencing any incidents of 
abuse by transgender women or other prisoners.”172  To show evidence 
of this, the NCTE cites a statewide study in California which found 
that “when transgender women are automatically housed with men, 
they were 13 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than male 
prisoners in the same facilities.”173  This shows that the Indiana DOC 
security concerns as stated in Kosilek lack merit, and that transgender 
inmates should be housed based on their expressed gender identity and 
not on their assigned sex at birth. 
All circuits that have denied GCS for a transgender inmate have 
also conceded that gender dysphoria is a diagnosis that has a serious 
medical need.174  Additionally, all circuits have cited the expert 
testimony of Dr. Cynthia Osborne.175  In Kosilek and Gibson, the First 
and Fifth Circuits cited Dr. Osborne’s expert testimony in holding that 
denying GCS for a transgender inmate does not constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation when there are “alternative methods 
available.”176  These alternative methods that Dr. Osborne advocated 
for in Kosilek and Gibson referred to hormone therapy and 
psychotherapy.177  However, in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo, 
the court recognized that Dr. Osborne had changed her views on 
whether GCS for transgender inmates is medically necessary.178  
 
170 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74. 
171 Ending Abuse of Transgender Prisoners: A guide to Winning Policy Change In 
Jails And Prisons, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (2018) 
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/EndingAbuseofTransgend
erPrisoners.pdf. 
172 Id. at 20. 
173 Id. at 20-21. 
174 See Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 
63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). 
175 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795-96; Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221-
22. 
176 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221-22. 
177 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221-22. 
178 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795-96. 
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Referencing Dr. Osborne’s response in Kosilek regarding whether she 
views GCS as medically necessary, the Ninth Circuit states “[t]o the 
extent this vague portrait of Dr. Osborne’s testimony conveys her 
belief that GCS is never medically necessary, she has apparently 
changed her view in the more than ten years since she testified [in 
Kosilek].”179  Dr. Osborne now views GCS as medically necessary “for 
some, though not all, persons with [gender dysphoria], including some 
prison inmates.”180  Dr. Osborne’s changed opinion on GCS weakens 
the holdings in Kosilek and Gibson because the First and Fifth Circuits 
gave ample weight to Dr. Osborne’s testimony in their decisions.181  
Dr. Osborne has changed her views on GCS, and now opines that it is 
medically necessary for some transgender inmates.  Thus, if Kosilek 
and Gibson had been decided today with the same weight given to the 
expert testimony of Dr. Osborne, the results may likely have come out 
on the same side as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo. 
The decisions rendered in Kosilek, Gibson, and Edmo show 
that the debate of GCS for transgender inmates in the medical and legal 
realm are still at odds. Fortunately, the change in Dr. Osborne’s 
opinion shows that the medical community is moving toward a 
consensus that the WPATH Standards of Care are the appropriate 
standards for transgender health and well-being.  Additionally, the 
significant comorbid conditions associated with gender dysphoria 
unambiguously show that gender dysphoria is a diagnosis that 
constitutes a serious medical need, and thus satisfies the first prong of 
the test for cruel and unusual punishment  established in Estelle.182  
Michelle Kosilek’s access to a variety of treatments for her gender 
dysphoria is a step in the right direction, but the First Circuit’s holding 
does not address the potential for future instances of suicide and self-
mutilation, which can affect future transgender inmates.  This in itself 
evidences a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the exact 
type of treatment that the Eighth Amendment proscribes.183  The 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to create a rule that would 
significantly reduce the risk of suicide and self-harm among 
transgender inmates, thus bringing awareness and notice to the serious 
medical need of gender dysphoria and likely reducing any deliberate 
 
179 Id. at 796. 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
181 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 108-110; Gibson, 935 F.3d at 795-96. 
182 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
183 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
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indifference to it.  The Court here had the chance for a home run but 
chose instead to not even step up to the plate. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although there has been significant progress regarding the 
LGBTQ community, the legal system is still far behind on the issue of 
transgender inmates.  Their care and access to GCS is an important 
issue that needs to be addressed.  As of this writing, only two 
transgender inmates have received GCS while in prison, one of them 
being Adree Edmo.184  This should be seen as light at the end of the 
tunnel, but due to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on the issue, 
many transgender inmates like Michelle Kosilek and Vanessa Lynn 
Gibson may very well die trying to fight for their right to receive GCS.  
Outside of the prison system, GCS is  readily available – one must 
simply fall within the purview of the requirements put forth in the 
WPATH Standards of Care to be deemed eligible.  This begs the 
question of why transgender inmates are fighting for their basic right 
to live as they truly are while those outside the system are eligible as 
long as they meet the requirements. 
In the words of Lisa Harvey, a transgender woman, regarding 
GCS: “It’s a lot of money, but it’s nothing compared to the 
psychological price of waiting for something you’ve wanted all your 
life.”185  The courts should require that GCS be provided for 
transgender inmates who have a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and 
satisfy the requirements of the WPATH Standards of Care.  Denying 
GCS to an individual who falls under these requirements is taking 
away a life that is worth saving and would be acting with deliberate 
 
184  Tommy Simmons, Idaho Transgender Inmate Becomes 2nd in Country to 
Receive Gender Confirmation Surgery, IDAHO PRESS (Jul. 27, 2020) 
https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/idaho-transgender-inmate-becomes-2nd-
in-country-to-receive-gender-confirmation-surgery/article_f2aad619-2735-5040-
8904-2a762f0734e9.html; Associated Press, California Murder Convict Becomes 
First U.S. Inmates to Have State Funded Sex Reassignment Surgery, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2017, 2:20 PM) https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-inmate-sex-
reassignment-20170106-story.html. 
185 Lisa Harvey, ‘I Don’t Need a Vagina to Feel Like a Woman’: Why Changing 
Gender Wasn’t About Switching One Body For Another – It Was About Saving My 
Life, GLAMOUR MAG. (Nov. 18, 2020) 
https://www.glamourmagazine.co.uk/article/charlie-hill-trans-interview. 
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indifference to a diagnosis with a serious medical need.  It constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  The 
Court will very likely be asked to consider this issue again in the future.  
It is unclear just how much time will pass and how many transgender 
inmates will die before the Court recognizes that transgender inmate 
lives are worth saving. 
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